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Few spheres of American domestic policy are as riddled by 
conflict or as dependent upon the judiciary for direction as 
envir'onmental'policy. In fact, the frequency and intensity of 
conflict have created a policy making void that the judiciary 
has, for bettor or worse,'filled. Given the incapacity of 
executive and legislative branches of government to resolve such 
fundamental disputes, the courts have become a dominant force in 
American environmental policy.1 
Court shaped policy, however, is suspect in terms of its 
capacity to protect human health, limit interference with 
economic growth, and stimulate the search for innovative methods 
. . 
to improve environmental quality. And it has attracted a host of 
critics in recent years, many of whom question the basic ability 
of courts to make competent decisions on science-oriented 
matters. 
The growing unrest' over our judicially-dominated 
environmental policy system has led to the exploration of 
alternative approaches to resolving environmental conflicts. 
These approaches include mediation, regulatory negotiation, and 
policy dialogue. Many of these are intended to mitigate conflict 
through direct and systematic interaction among disputants. 
Rather than delegate dispute resolution to a judge, jury, or 
arbiter, these alternatives force varying parties to design their . 
own solutions, with policy reflecting group consensus rather than 
judicial decree. 
In theory, these approaches offer ways to forge a style of 
environmental policy that is more cooperative and effective. And 
in practice, there are considerable grounds for optimism on both 
counts. Other spheres of domestic policy, including labor and 
management relations and special education, have long relied on 
comparable approaches that were generally deemed effective. Even 
in conflict-riddled environmental policy, a growing number of 
disputes have been at least partially resolved through 
utilization of such approaches. 
,These initial experiments have resulted in an outpouring of 
publicatons on "environmental dispute resolution" (EDR). Many of 
these chroni'cle one or more environmental conflicts that were 
resolved through mediation or a related approach. Most are 
extremely enthusiastic about the potential of EDR and few 
perceive any significant impediment to vast expansion in its use 
or any significant policy shortcoming if it were to be widely 
employed. 
This paper is intended to inject a sense of balance into the 
current search for alternatives to judicially-dominated 
environmental policy. It recognizes the considerable potential 
of EDR but suggests that it is best viewed as a possible 
regulatory reform rather that a proven alternative that can and 
should transform enviromnental policy. The rationale for EDR in 
the current conflict-ridden climate and an assessment of its 
considerable promise will be explored in greater detail. 
However, most of the paper will examine possible obstacles that 
any effort to expand EDR may face given the realities of American 
policies. It will also question the potential capabilites of EDR 
to deliver more effective environmental policy, even if these 
political hurdles can be cleared. 
THE PENCHANT FOR CONFLICT AND THE 
PURSUIT OF ALTERNATIVES 
The American political system is poorly equipped to resolve 
conflicts when passions run deep and interests are well- 
entrenched on both sides. Such problems are rare in distributive 
or developmental policies, in which elected officials are only 
too happy to authorize revenues or services for designated 
constituencies. But they are common in redistributive or 
regulative policies, where some constituencies are likely to be 
disadvantaged by any decision. This is perticularly evident in 
the context of environmental policy, where the economic and 
social stakes are quite high and a compromise position is rarely 
apparent. 
Elected officials are likely to balk at resolving conflicts 
in such situations. They may try to placate pro-regulation 
constituents with legislation that is symbolically impressive but 
not overly-threatening to anti-regulation constituents, (such as 
the Toxic Substances Control Act). Or they may transform 
regulatory policies into distributive policies by directly 
funding most of a mandated cleanup activity (such as the Water 
Pollution Control Act). But they will enter fundamental ' 
conflicts with considerable trepidation and will be, in all 
likelihood, only too happy to defer to the judiciary on such 
matters. 
Congress has in fact encouraged shifting of decisions that 
it might have made to the judicial realm with the expensive 
definitions of legal standing and broad citizen suit provisions 
included in many major pieces of environmental legislation. As a 
comparative analysis of environmental policy in American and 
other industrial nations concluded, "U.S. law erects the lowest 
entry barriers against both.associations and individuals wishing 
to challenge adminstrative decisions" (Brickman, Jasanoff and 
Ligen, 1985:109). The ever-growing body of pressure groups that 
have formed around environmental issues has seized this 
opportunity to challenge virtually every aspect of'environmental 
policy. These groups represent both pro- and anti-industrial 
forces and take advantage of the relatively lower costs of trying 
to shape policy through legal challenge instead of legislative 
lobbying. As a result, many of the major.environmenta1 policy 
conflicts--from interpretation of the Clean Air Act to siting a 
hazardous waste facility in a particular community--must 
ultimately be resolved by the judiciary. As former Environmental 
Protection Agency Administrator William Ruckelshaus (1984) has 
explained, federal environmental officials generally assume a 
tenativeness to any action that they might take since 
approximately four of every five rules promulgated by the agency 
are challenged by suits. 
This pattern is consistent with the historical American 
reliance on dispersal of power among branches of government and 
distrust of ceding European-style authority to the agencies 
responsible for carrying out regulatory legislation (Price, 1983; 
Heclo, 1977). It also follows a growing American tendency to, 
resolve fundemental policy problems through litigation. As 
Jethro Lieberrman (1981) has observed, America has become a 
"litigious society", and he uses litigation-laden environmental 
policy as a cornerstone in defending his thesis. 
The Doubts Concerning Judicial Capacity 
Judicial domination of spheres of domestic policy would 
probably not be very controversial if there were not doubts over 
the capacity of courts to make timely, informed, and balanced 
decisions. But once one dispenses with the aura'of judicial 
mystique that long dominated social science accounts of judicial 
behavior, a very serious set of questions must be explored. In 
fact, a growing number of criticisms have been raised in recent 
years that pose basic challenges to the ability of courts to 
confine themselves to appropriate areas of intervention and 
effectively address complex .issues. 
At one extreme, critics assert that judges have aggressively 
, 
sought to fill the political void in dealing with controversial 
issues. Full blown theories of "judicial imperialism" are rare, 
but a change of judicial'overzealousness in various policy areas 
is rather widespread. This aggressiveness is seen as 
particularly dangerous in instances where courts move beyond 
resolution of a specific dispute and begin to engage in far- 
reaching policy analysis, as they have in "mass toxic tort" cases 
such as Agent Orange (Schuck, 1987:4). 
Courts have also become suspect in terms of their basic 
competence to deal with the kinds of highly-technical issues that 
are so common in environmental cases. Not only are courts 
burdened with the host of cases requiring conversance with a wide 
range of policy issues, but few judges or clerks are trained in 
the scientific and related methodological skills needed to 
develop a basic understanding of many cases. Most judges are 
legal generalists and many were trained before environmental law 
became a fairly common elective in legal education. 
Courts may also have unusual difficulty in daaling with 
environmental cases because they deviate from the bi-polar 
pattern that is common in many other dispute areas and for which 
they are best suited. Consistent with Lon Fuller's (1981) 
doctrine of "polycentrism", courts are poorly equipped to sort 
out the competing claims of more than two parties. Environmental 
cases commonly involve three or more parties, consistent with the 
multiplicity of agencies and pressure groups active in 
environmental policy. According to R. .Step Melnick (1983:61), 
they adhere to the model "that legal scholars for years claimed 
was not appropriate for judicial resolution". 
The absence'of environmental policy expertize and the 
proliferation of participating parties further explains the 
rather inconsistent, ad hoc way in which many envrionmental cases 
are decided. Melnick (1983:61) has detected considerable 
variation in cases concerning the Clean Air Act, finding that 
different U.S Circuit Courts interpret the Act in very different 
ways. Even within a single envrionmental case, a change in 
presiding judges in mid-case can result in a radically different 
interpretation of the proper role of the court and outcome (see, 
for example, Shuck, 1987:113). 
Uninformed, inconsistent decisions can obviously have 
serious policy consequences. But the basic process of a court- 
based approach to dispute resolution may have adverse policy 
ramifications regardless of the quality of the ultimate 
decisions. The reliance on adversarial procedures leads 
disputants to take extreme positions and may destroy any prospect 
of a reasonable central ground. According to Gregory Deneke, 
"Court rulings have reinforced that adversarial relationship, and 
in some cases prevent any type of consiliation between parties 
from taking place" (Daneke, 1984:145; Downing, 1983). 
Strong reliance on courts to shape environmental policy may 
thus prove extremely expensive, both in terms of implementation 
inefficiencies and the laborious process of resolving disputes. 
In the absence of an overarching political or social consensus, 
each challenge must be hammered out separately, involving all of 
the direct costs of operating courts as well as the far greater 
long-term costs of delay and indecision. These factors may help 
to explain why the costs of implementing environmental programs 
are significantly greater for governmental programs and industry 
in the United states than Western European nations, although 
there is minimal discernible difference in the environmental and 
public health impacts of these regulatory programs (Brickman, 
Jasanoff and Ligen, 1985; Vogel, 1986). 
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 
These doubts surrounding judicial capacity to forge 
coherent, effective environmental policy have triggered a search 
for dispute resolution alternatives in recent years. Non- 
litigative methods for dispute resolution are not new, but only 
in recent years have they been utilized with any frequency in 
American environmental issuses. In theory, these various methods 
are linked by their emphasis on bringing contending parties 
together to explore possible settlements. This may involve 
mediation of a specific environmental controversy, such as the 
authorization of water quality permits at a single manufacturing 
plant.. It may also address broader issues, as in a policy 
dialogue in which a neutral convener will help a large number of 
interested parties chart long-term strategies for environmental 
policy. 
As recently as a decade ago these EDR app'roaches were 
clearly confined to the fringes of American environmental policy. 
Few EDR cases had been undertaken, much less resolved, and 
virtually no research had been conducted. This was in vivid 
contrast with several other areas of domestic policy in which 
dispute resolution alternatives were well established and the 
overall role of the judiciary more subdued. It was also in 
contrast with the practices of many other Western democracies, 
including most nations of Western Europe, in which the courts 
have far less influence in environmental and other areas of 
domestic policy and more consensual process of dispute resolution 
are well established. 
But EDR has clearly gained a foothold in American 
environmental policy since the mid-1970's and gives every 
indication of being utilized in more environmental conflicts in 
future decades. One of the major forms of EDR has been 
mediation, as the number of environmental disputes that have been 
mediated increased from none in 1977 to 161 by mid-1984. These 
disputes have involved a wide array of environmental issues and 
78 percent of them have reached some from of agreement (Bingham, 
1986:7-8, 32-33, 73). Far-reaching policy dialogues have 
attained some degree of consensus in complex areas such as coal 
development and groundwater protection. And federal regulatory 
Administration, and the Federal Aviation Agency, have begun 
experimentation with "regulatory negotiation", a form of 
negotiated rule-making that seeks to develop a consensus among 
contending parties in place of prolonged legal challenges to 
agency-proposed rules (Gusman and Harter, 1986, Susskind and 
McMahon, 1985). 
EDR is also beginning to be used on more than an ad hoc 
basis. Six states have institutionalized some form of mediation 
0 
.in the siting of hazardous waste facilities before parties may 
pursue arbitration or litigation.2 Five states have established 
statewide mediation offices, funded in part by the National 
Institute for Dispute Resolution, that assist states in providing 
mediation services for environmental and other conflicts.3 A 
number of other states are considering additional measures that 
attempt not.only to increase the frequency with which EDR is used 
but also to formally embrace it as a preferred alternative to 
court-resolved disputes. 
THE POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Environmental dispute resolution has acquired a certain 
acceptability in environmental policy circles, having been 
embraced by such mainline environmental organizations as the 
Conservation Foundation and the National Wildlife Federation. 
Some of its strongest proponents have argued that the United 
States may be about to usher in a new era in which EDR use 
continues to expand at an exponential rate and becomes 
commonplace in. resolving disputes. Jay Hair (1984), Executive 
Vice President of the National Wildlife Federation, has predicted 
that more than half of all environmental disputes will be handled 
through EDR procedures 'by the year 2000. 
But before an era of EDR can or should be proclaimed, this 
alternative must be exposed to far more careful and critical 
scrutiny than it has been to date. American environmental policy 
has a history of lurching from panacea to panacea, in an ongoing 
search for a regulatory approach that will transform the 
regulatory system. Perhaps the most recent of these fads has 
been the variety of strategies designed to apply economic models 
to environmental policy, such as emissions trading. Oversold 
initially as an inherently superior form of regulation, these 
approaches have now come to be seen as far more complicated and 
suspect than anticipated (Kelman, 1982; Liroff, 1986). They 
warrant very careful examination before being used more 
extensively. It is entirely possible that EDR may be on the 
verge of becoming the next environmental policy panacea. While 
it may ultimately prove far more superior to current methods of 
dispute resolution, we need to know a great deal more about the 
contexts in which it does and does not work effectively and the 
extent to which it advances fundamental objectives such as 
protection of the environment and human health. 
Most prior efforts to analyze EDR have suffered from a . 
variety of limitations. Only a relatively few cases have been 
completed until recent years, posing obvious research dilemnas. 
Moreover, very little effort has been made to place existing 
findings in the context of a politically-oriented theoretical 
framework that would facilitate long-term analysis as the number 
of cases grows. Most efforts at theory construction have 
consisted of fairly general predictors of negotiation success; 
many rely primarily on highly-descriptive case study accounts 
that lack a tightly-structured comparative case perspective 
(Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler, 1983; Talbot, 1983; Bacow and 
Wheeler, 1984). A new generation of research may be forthcoming, 
along the lines of Gail Binghamls Resolving Environmental 
Disputes (1986), that establishes some systematic measure of 
mediation outcome and implementation success for dozens of cases. 
But we still have far too little evidence to make any other than 
very general claims about EDR. 
The existing literature is also suspect in that many of the 
leading researchers in this area are also in the vanguard of 
activists promoting expanded EDR use. Much of what we know 
empirically about EDR and its effectiveness has been dominated by 
individuals with a strong normative commitment to EDR, many of 
whom are professional mediators. This poses enormous conflict of 
interest problems that call into question the rather upbeat 
arguments found in many of the leading publications on EDR. It 
is, in fact, tantamount to basing our understanding of regulatory 
behavior primarily on the self-analysis of leading regulators, 
such as former EPA administrators, rather than on.intensive and 
nonpartisan research completed by social scientists without a 
vested interest in demonstrating regulatory success. 
There are also significant limits on the extent to which 
claims of EDR efficacy can be made on the basis of more extensive 
research conducted in other policy areas where dispute resolution 
alternatives are more easily established. Special education 
mediastion, for example, often involves fairly straightforward 
issues and a common goal of devising the .best educational service 
plan for each child; these are simplifying factors uncommon in 
environmental disputes (Singer and Nace, 1985). Resolution of 
claims disputes through mediation involves very specific 
conflicts between individuals, whereas environmental disputes 
tend to involve very broad conflicts between groups (McEwen and 
Maiman, 1984). Perhaps the most thoroughly institionalized and 
studied area in which alternative dispute resolution has been 
employed, labor and management relations, may be of limited 
analogous value to environmental policy (Bingham, 1986:162-163). 
And in the one study that offers a framework for comparative 
analysis of alternative dispute resolution across policy areas, 
environmental policy was deemed an area in which the potential 
benefits to society were very high but the chances of success 
were very low (Marcus, Nadel and Merrikin, 1 9 8 4 : 2 3 6 ) .  
In the absence of a clear understanding of what EDR has 
accomplished and what can realistically be expected from it, 
subsequent sections of this paper will outline a variety of 
potential pitfalls that need to be considered in future 
deliberations over EDR use and continued expansion. They attempt 
to raise a number of issues that may' pose major stumbling blocks 
for EDR, but have not yet been examined in any systematic way. 
These sections are drawn heavily from theroetical understandihgs 
of American politics and they caution that the American political 
context may prove incompatible in many respects with alternative 
methods of dispute resolution in environmental policy. 
POTENTIAL POLITI.CAL IMPEDIMENTS 
Any strategy to expand American reliance on alternative 
methods for resolving environmental disputes must recognize the 
realities of the American political system. These realities 
suggest a well-ingrained pattern of conflictual, highly 
adversarial institutions and precedures for resolving conflict 
and establishing policy. Consistent with this is a judicial 
branch of government that is intended to resolve fundamental 
conflicts and also serve as co-equal to legislative and executive 
branches. If not uniquely American features, they are far more 
firmly established in the United States than other Western 
democracies where more flexible and consensual, and less 
judicially-oriented. patterns prevail. 
The Absence of Unitary Democracy 
Environmental dispute resolution would be most likely to 
flourish in a society in which interests were widely presumed to 
be common and basic patterns of governance and were consensual. 
Such a society is reflected in many political philosophers, 
including Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Hegel, and may be 
particularly compatible with certain contemporary non-Western 
societies. It may even be evident in certain Western 
democracies, such as those of Austria and the Netherlands, which 
use consociational (proportional, multi-party) as opposed to 
majoritarian (winner-take-all, often two-party) electoral 
methods. 
Political philosopher ~ a n e  Mansbridge (1983) characterizes a 
society with a consensual pattern of operation as a "unitary" 
democracy. She acknowledges that an unitary democracy can 
occasionally emerge in American politics, but that it is 
exceptional to a prevailing pattern of adversarialism. Under 
"adversarial" -democracy, politics approximate a zero-sum game in 
which interests in both economy and policy are presumed to be in 
conflict. Through various forms of compensation, whether in the 
marketplace or in a court room, conflicts are resolved and 
certain interests are elevated above others. 
Applied to envorinmental policy, adversarial democracy would 
find an array of industrial, governmental, and anti-industry 
groups with very different interpretations of society's 
resonsibility for envvironmental protection. Rather than 
consensually arrive at environmental questions or conflicts, 
adversarial understandings and procedures would prevail, much as 
they do at present in the United States. 
Mansbridge's emphasis on American adversarial democracy is 
consistent with interpretations by other leading social 
scientists. Robert Bellah and associates, for example, have 
characterized "utilitarian individualism" as an enduring 
characteristic of American political life (Bellah, 1985, 
Auerbach, 1983). With very little emphasis on communitarian 
responsibilities and little interest in consensual structures of 
governance, Americans are largely alien to approaches that 
Mansbridge could characterize as unitarian. 
Research that compares environmental policy in the United 
States and various Western European nations highlights ,the 
enduring American penchant for adversarialism. Quite contrary to 
the more collaborative, consensual pattern of interaction among 
major groups in the United Kingdom, David Vogel (1986:280)' deems 
adversarialism a basic component of Amreican policy. He iotes, 
for example, that "the most important way In which environmental 
groups in America 'assist1 regulatory agencies in policy far more 
adverserial than that of France or West Germany (Brickman, 
Jasanoff and Ligen, 1985:270). 
Groups that advocate environmental protection might find it 
particularly difficult to abandon adversial and litigation- 
oriented political strategies. Many such groups have taken full 
advantage of litigation opportunities to attain the maximum 
political impact with their limited resources. Moreover, some 
advocate such an adversarial posture as a good investment, as 
groups are often rewarded with settlement dollars that only 
bolster their treasuries and make possible future legal battles 
on other issues (Freudenberg, 1984:166-167). 
The American penchant for adversarialism does not preclude 
the introduction of more unitarian methods for addressing 
environmental policy. The very reemgence of EDR in dozens of . 
specific cases suggests tha*, consistent with Mansbridge's 
thesis, unitarian approaches can exist in the same society 
alongside adversarial ones. Nonetheless, the adversarial culture 
of American politics and the related nature of its political 
institutions and processes impose a significant potential threat 
to any effort to expand EDR. 
The Disdain Toward Bargaining 
The difficulty of introducing more consensual processes in 
American policy is compounded by the lack of public trust in the 
institutions with direct responsibility for protecting the 
environment and public health. The predominance of open, 
adversarial procedures of dispute resolution stems in part from 
an inherent mistrust of political bargaining that is confined to 
select elites. This is particularly evident in areas such as 
environmental policy, where potential environmental and health 
risks are so high and the track record of government and industry 
is so spotty. Environmental issues, in fact, are almost classic 
examples of the kinds of issues that can be characterized as 
having unusually high public salience and attract highly 
polarized pressure groups (Price, 1979). This salience and 
conflict may be greater in health-related cases rather than those 
that focus solely on environmental and natural resources issues. 
The former may well be the kinds of issues that the American 
public is least likely to hand over to negotiation, which seeks 
some form of middle ground. Instead, they may be issues that will 
be expected to be resolved in public, adversarial settings which 
seek, at least in theory, the most appropriate policy remedy. 
Political bargaining has acquired an especially unsavory 
quality in the United States in recent decades, reflected in 
post-Watergate and post-Vietnam reforms that have opened up the 
American policy-making process to the public. These reforms have 
included greater citizen access to the courts, mandatory citizen 
participation in operation of federally funded programs, greater 
reliance on public hearings in policy formation, and 
unprecedented disclosure of information, whether through compaign 
finance reforms or the Freedom of Information Act. This general 
trend reflects a growing disdain for any semblance of a closed 
process or political dealing. It differs dramatically from the 
severe restrictions on public information and access common to 
more consensual Western European systems (Vogel, 1986:92-93). As - 
Wendy Emrich (1984) has observed, here is a danger that 
environmental mediation "may be seen as a reversion to back room 
political dealing" by limiting the number of participants in 
dispute resolution and, in many instances, deliberating over 
public issues in a highly private setting. This is particularly 
likely in environmental1 policy, given the unsavory quality of 
"voluntary compliance" and "negotiation" efforts undertaken by 
the EPA in the Anne Gorsuch years. 
The potential for conflict over restricting public access 
may well emerge in cases where states have attempted to 
institutionalize EDR. In Virginia, notes from negotiation of 
land use planning disputes are exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act. This is similar to negotiation-oriented 
legislation that has been proposed in other states which also 
prohibits use of information that emerges from negotiations to be 
used in any future adjudicatory hearing. Both types of 
restrictions may be imperative to negotion success, but run 
contrary to recent patterns toward openness in public policy. 
The Danger of Exclusivity 
Environmental dispute resolution may also run the risk of 
attracting considerable potential opposition in the United States 
because of its.tendency to formally exclude certain groups from 
participating. By the late 1960s, American environmental 
legislation was under severe attack both for being too lenient on 
polluters and also for maintaining a highly cooperative and 
consensual relationship between government and industry. Among 
the leading goals of major environmental legislation enacted or 
amended in the 1970s was the establishment of highly specific 
standards and procedures that the new EPA would be required to 
rigorously impose upon industry. This growing reliance on highly 
exact pollution reduction goals occurred alongside the general 
openings up of the environmental policy process-that encouraged 
formation of a potpourri of pressure groups devoted to 
environmental and human health protection. Many such groups have 
made full use of participatory opportunities available in our 
highly adversarial system. They have greatly influenced policy 
and have become accustomed to fully participating in every stage 
of policy formation process. New procedures designed to promote 
more consensual resolution of environmental disputes must operate 
in this context, and somehow find means to incorporate this 
substantial demand for participation with efforts to create a. 
more stable and consensual process. It is by no means certain 
that such a blend is possible. 
In fact, the consensual precedures so common to Western 
European "corporatist" societies rely in large part on the 
capacity to confine negotiation to a relatively small and stable 
number of well-established groups. The process of determining 
what groups are and are not included tends to reward moderate, 
compliant groups with participatory opportunities while excluding 
more strident ones. It also tends to favor industrial and other 
pollution sources rather than environmental protection advocates 
(Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1977; Katzenstein, 1984). This ensures 
the stability so envied by many observers of pluralistic 
societies, but runs all the risks of regulatory "capture" by 
vested industrial groups which has been so vigorously avoided in 
' American environmental policy (Wilson, 1980). And it is 
particularly dangerous in .technically complicated areas such as 
environmental policy in which industrial groups are likely to 
have the resources necessary to fund participation and research 
that opposing groups are likely to lack. It may lead to the 
potentially significant imbalance in negotiation strength that 
might be lessened in a more adversarial context. Moreover, 
opposition groups in a pluralistic society such as the United 
States are far less likely to receive direct governmental 
subsidies that curb adversarial tendencies and facilitate 
meaningful participation, contrary to the common pattern of their 
subsidization in Western Europena democracies. 
Even as strong an advocate of unitary democracy as Jane 
Mansbridge (1963:276-277) emphasizes that consensual processes of 
conflict resolution cannot be embraced uncritically and may lead 
to less sucdessful results in certain situations. She is 
particularly concerned that policy. outcomes from a unitary 
process may rebound to the advantage of the politically strongest 
negotiation participants. This problem has begun to emerge in 
Massachusetts, in the case of the state ~azardous Waste Facility 
Siting Act, which institutionalized the process of negotiation 
' and is perhaps the most ambitious state legislation to date in 
this area. It has experienced enormous difficulty in 
facilitating broad participation and keeping the negotiation 
process workable. One major concern has been a percieved power 
imbalance that enables siting opponents to dominate the 
negotiation.process, as their refusal to interact with site 
developers has thwarted site proposals in the first six cases 
considered under the Act. 
The Demand for Exactitude 
'Even if problems of exclusivity were overcome by providing 
broad and workable participatory opportunities, it is uncertain 
that pro-regulatory groups, and the citizenry more generally, 
would support the shift toward more consensual forms of dispute 
resolution. American environmental policy is complicated greatly 
by an extreme public aversion to health-related environmental 
risk. This adversion may greatly exceed justifiable fear, 
particularly in comparison to other public health dangers, such 
as smoking, which may pose a greater health hazard but which fail 
to trigger comparable alarm. But it is evident in the unusual 
specificity and stringency with which regulatory standards are 
set in this area, the extent to which absolutist health- 
protection goals are accepted in legislation, and the extensive 
use of science to measure health ramifications of pollution and 
guide policy. And in this climate, it might prove very difficult 
to gain acceptance for consensual procedures that could result'in 
a bargained reduction of commitment to health protection 
standards. By contrast, environmental disputes lacking a public 
health dimension might bypass this problem. 
The American aversion to environmental health risk is linked 
to an unusually strong public belief that science can determine 
risk with precision and thereby mold policy remedies. Rather 
than' trust governmental, industrial, and environmental group 
leaders to negotiate reasonable regulatory compromises, American 
environmental policy is uniquely deferential to prevailing 
science thought. Some analysts deem this deference to science 
excessive and suggest that it may not result in effective 
regulatory policy (Sapolsky, 1986; Price, 1983). Nonetheless, 
the political context in which EDR would have to be introduced 
might prove hostile to any process that emphasized negotiated 
compromise over science in guiding environmental policy. 
The Burden of Proving Superior Outcomes 
The ultimate litmus test of any effort to switch from 
adversarial, court-oriented methods of dispute resolution to more 
consensual ones in the United States will be the outcomes of that 
process. And yet there is virtually no analysis--and even very 
little explicit speculation--concerning the capacity of EDR to 
deliver more efficacious environmental policy in terms of 
protecting the environmental and human health and doing so in a 
cost-effective manner. The vast majority of analysis has focused 
more generally on the process. It often asserts the inherent 
superiority of addressing the conflict in a consensual rather 
than adversarial manner, instead of. providing a systematic basis 
for comparative analysis. 
It remains by no means clear that consensual politics 
inherently leads to better environmental policy. Among political 
theorists who consider the efficacy of cooperative versus 
conflictual regimes, it is emphasized that cooperative systems 
have many attributes but are not without shortcomings.. As Duncan 
Snidal (1985) has noted, "one must be somewhat wary of the 
presumption that stability--even stability of cooperative 
outcomes--is always a virtue". Conflict theorist James 
Schellenberg summarizes a general concern raised by many analysts 
in noting: 
The pressures toward unity . . .  may have their casualties in 
decision-making effectiveness. One of the chief casualities 
is a blased scanning of alternatives to action, selecting 
only those for attention that are anticipated to have high 
acceptance by others in the group. The result may well be a 
group-induced tendency to omit consideration of unuaual 
possibilities of action (Schellenberg. 1982:196).4 
Such concerns are, of course, very general in nature and 
have yet to be demonstrated in environmental policy issues 
resolved through alternative dispute resolution. But they are 
the types of concerns that will need to be alleviated if EDR is 
to prove superior to adversarial procedures both in terms of 
providing a more consensual process and in attaining the 
fundamental goals of environmental policy. They also warrant 
attention in that other efforts to foster more consensual 
precedures have proven somewhat disappointing in terms of policy 
outcomes. 
The system of environemntal policy so well established in 
many Western European nations has clearly delivered a more 
consensual and less expensive process for dispute resolution and 
policy formation. But there is very little evidence to suggest 
that this system is more effective in protecting the environment 
and human health than the American adversarial system. Despite 
dramatically different systems, neither the United States nor 
Western Europe has proven particularly effective in addressing 
serious environmental problems, including acid rain, hazardous 
and nuclear waste disposal, and toxic substance control. 
Comparative research is scarce but indicates fairly similar 
outcomes despite the fundamental systematic differences. And in 
certain Western European nations; such as West Germany, a more 
adversarial approach is emerging in response to growing public 
unrest over the reliability of their current regulatory systems. 
Other areas of domestic policy in which prevailing adversarial 
approaches have been widely lamented further suggest that 
consensual alternatives do not necessarily cover better policy 
outcomes (Danzon, 1985:187-195). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has cautioned against any embrace of 
environmental dispute resolution as a panacea that can be relied 
upon to cure much of what ails ~merican environmental policy. It 
acknowledged the shortcomings of our current adversarial approach 
to dispute resolution and policy formation in this area, but 
emphasized a number of fundamental qualities of American 
political life that may mitigate against any effort to employ EDR 
approaches on a broad scale. Nonetheless EDR retains 
considerable promise as a component of environmental regulatory 
remedy that can be easily applied to all disputes. It still may 
be able to play a profoundly important role in facilitating more 
mature and effective environmental policy. EDR may best be 
thought of as one of a series of alternatives to current 
approaches, one that warrants.continued experimentation and 
analysis that considers the conditions under which it is and is 
not ,likely .to facilitate consensus and deliver superior policy 
outcomes. 
NOTES 
1. I appreciate funding from the Hewlett Foundation and 
The Program on Conflict Management Alternatives at the 
University of Michigan that has supported my research on 
environmental dispute resolution. I also am grateful for 
the he-lpful comments on earlier versions provided by 
Margaret Boone, Tony Citrin, J. Clarence Davies, Lynn 
Deniston, Robert Kazmann, Philip Mundo, Pam Puntenney, and 
Kenneth Warner. 
2. These states include Massachusetts, Wisconsin, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island. Texas, and Virginia. 
- 
3. These states include Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, and Wisconsin. See Bingham, 1985:57-58.4. A 
leading analyst of comparative areas of planning and 
conflict resolution, John Seley has emphasized that 
"conflict can be a very positive force in society (some 
argue that it is the one compelling force in true 
democracies), It should not be viewed only as something to 
be avoided" (Seley, 1983:15). 
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